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INTRODUCTION
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United States
Army Corps of Engineers,1 a case in which Judge Diane Wood
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel, addressed important questions about both the Commerce Clause
and the Clean Water Act2 (CWA). The Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit’s decision by a vote of five to four.3 To read
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion side by side with Judge
Wood’s is to see a contrast that does not, to put it mildly, make
the Supreme Court look good. Judge Wood’s opinion is lucid, careful, and measured; it deals with the complexities of environmental protection in a realistic way. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court is loosely reasoned and almost transparently result
oriented. As it turned out, the Supreme Court’s decision in
SWANCC (as it is abbreviated) was a first step in rolling back the
federal government’s power to implement the CWA.4 And the contrast between what Judge Wood did and what the Court did is a
warning about the future not just of environmental protection but
of the administrative state.
I. SWANCC IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
SWANCC concerned the “Migratory Bird Rule,”5 which was
promulgated by the US Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to its
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authority under the CWA.6 The litigation over the Rule originated
in the “efforts of a consortium of Illinois municipalities to find a
place to dump their trash.”7 The municipalities bought a parcel of
land that had, decades before, been a strip mining site. “[A] labyrinth of trenches and other depressions remained behind” and
“the land evolved into an attractive woodland” with “over 200 permanent and seasonal ponds.”8 Those ponds, which “range[d] from
less than one-tenth of an acre to several acres in size, and from
several inches to several feet in depth,”9 were the habitat for over
100 species of birds. Judge Wood described the aviary:
These include many endangered, water-dependent, and migratory birds. Among the species that have been seen nesting, feeding, or breeding at the site are mallard ducks, wood
ducks, Canada geese, sandpipers, kingfishers, water
thrushes, swamp swallows, redwinged blackbirds, tree swallows, and several varieties of herons. Most notably, the site
is a seasonal home to the second-largest breeding colony of
great blue herons in northeastern Illinois, with approximately 192 nests in 1993.10
The municipalities, in order to dispose of their garbage, would
have had to fill in over seventeen acres of this “semi-aquatic property” in the woodland.11
The question in the case was whether the CWA required the
municipalities to get a permit from the Corps before they did so.
The CWA forbids “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”
with various exceptions.12 The “discharge of a pollutant” includes
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source,”13 and “pollutant” includes the kinds of things the municipalities presumably wanted to use to fill the ponds: “dredged
spoil,” “rock,” and “sand.”14 One of the exceptions to the prohibition is for discharges allowed by a permit,15 and Section 404(a) of
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the CWA authorized the Corps to issue a permit “for the discharge
of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.”16
The case turned on the definition of “navigable waters.” The
various ponds on the site that the municipalities wanted to fill
were not navigable in the ordinary sense of the word. But the
CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” does not refer to navigation: it defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.”17 The Environmental Protection Agency and the Corps, by regulation, defined the “waters
of the United States” to include a wide range of intrastate waters
“the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.”18 And the Corps issued a statement—
the Migratory Bird Rule—that Section 404(a) applied to intrastate waters that “are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties” or that “are or would be used
as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines.”19
The Corps denied the municipalities’ applications for a permit, finding that the ponds they wanted to fill were, in fact, used
as habitat by migratory birds.20 The municipalities then sued,
challenging the Migratory Bird Rule on three grounds: (1) that
Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause to reach
the intrastate waters to which the Rule applied; (2) that the CWA
did not authorize the Rule; and (3) that the Corps should have
followed the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act21 (APA) when it issued the Rule.22
Judge Wood’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit rejected all
three claims. As far as the Commerce Clause was concerned,
Judge Wood said, there was no serious question that “the destruction of migratory bird habitat and the attendant decrease in the
populations of these birds ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce.”23 Millions of people observe or hunt migratory birds, traveling interstate and spending billions of dollars to do so; there are
“numerous international treaties and conventions designed to
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protect migratory birds”;24 and Supreme Court cases had “recognize[ed] the ‘national interest of very nearly the first magnitude’
in protecting such birds.”25 While the municipalities’ proposed action might not, by itself, substantially affect interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court had made it clear that the question was not
about that single action but about the aggregate effect of the destruction of migratory birds’ habitats: “The effect may not be observable as each isolated pond used by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding is filled, but the aggregate effect is clear, and
that is all the Commerce Clause requires.”26 Judge Wood anticipated the objection that “the Corps will be trying to regulate the
filling of every puddle that forms after a rainstorm, at least if a
bird is seen splashing in it”; the Corps, she explained, could not
apply the Rule unless it determined that a particular body of water was a habitat—a place where birds “naturally live[ ] or
grow[ ]”—and the Corps had made such a determination about
the bodies of water that the municipalities wanted to fill.27
Judge Wood then concluded that the Migratory Bird Rule was
consistent with the CWA. She noted that the agency’s interpretation of the CWA was entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A.
Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,28 as long as the statute was ambiguous, which the definition of “navigable waters”
plainly was.29 Previous Seventh Circuit decisions had established
that the Act reached as far as the Commerce Clause allowed.30
Because Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
prevent the destruction of migratory birds’ habitat, it was, Judge
Wood said, “certainly reasonable” for the Corps to interpret the
CWA to permit it to adopt the Rule.31
II. SWANCC IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision.32
The Court’s opinion focused on the word “navigable.”33 This was
24

Id at 851.
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an odd word for the Court to emphasize, for several reasons. For
one thing, as Justice John Paul Stevens pointed out in dissent,
the CWA’s definition—“the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas”—“requires neither actual nor potential navigability.”34 For another, in a previous decision, United States v
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc,35 the Court had explicitly said that
the use of the word “navigable” in the CWA was of “limited import” and that Congress intended the CWA to “regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”36 And Riverside Bayview had
upheld a regulation of non-navigable wetlands.37 But the Court in
SWANCC declared that “it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it no effect whatever,”38 and that
Riverside Bayview was distinguishable because it involved a wetland that was adjacent to navigable waters.39 As for Chevron, the
Court, in addition to asserting (implausibly) that the statute was
clear,40 said that the agency was not entitled to deference because
its interpretation of the statute “invoke[d] the outer limits of Congress’ power” and there was no “clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”41 The Court added that the concern with
avoiding a constitutional issue “is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state power.”42
The three notions toward which the Supreme Court’s opinion
gestured—navigability, constitutional avoidance, and federalism—are all highly manipulable, at least (or perhaps especially)
in the context of the CWA. And even taken together, they did not
justify the conclusion that the Court reached.
Navigability—as Justice Stevens explained in his dissent—
was the principal concern of the first generation of federal laws
dealing with water pollution, but the CWA, enacted in 1972,
sharply changed the focus of the antipollution regime.43 When
Congress first regulated water pollution, the problem it identified
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was that pollution would physically obstruct interstate waterways.44 The CWA, by contrast, was directed not at physical obstructions of navigation but at preventing environmental degradation.45 That was why the statutory definition omitted a
reference to navigability.46 And the purpose of preventing environmental degradation included, as the Court itself had recognized in Riverside Bayview, “the protection of ‘significant natural
biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites’ for various
species of aquatic wildlife.”47 In its decision in SWANCC, the Supreme Court insisted that navigability still had something to do
with the limits on the government’s power, but it never explained
why navigability mattered, or in what way it mattered, or what
principle distinguished wetlands adjacent to navigable waters
(which, under Riverside Bayview, the CWA did reach) from the
ponds used by the migratory birds in SWANCC.
In order to explain why the Migratory Bird Rule should not
receive at least Chevron deference, the Court in SWANCC also
invoked the canon that statutes should be interpreted in a way
that avoids serious constitutional questions.48 Notoriously, this
canon can enable a court to muddy the reason for its decision and
escape responsibility.49 The court can avoid having to explain either why a statute cannot be construed in a certain way, or why,
if it were, the statute would be unconstitutional. Instead, a court
can say that the statute might not permit a certain result, and if
it permitted that result it might be unconstitutional. On that basis, a court can reach a conclusion that could not be justified by a
straightforward interpretation of the statute and the Constitution.
That is what the Supreme Court did when it reversed Judge
Wood’s decision in SWANCC. As Judge Wood explained, and as
previous Seventh Circuit cases had held, the CWA could easily be
construed to reach the limits of Congress’s Commerce Clause
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powers.50 The conference committee report—the most reliable
form of legislative history—said as much.51 At the very least, that
was a plausible view for an agency to take, and under Chevron
the agency’s view was entitled to deference. As Judge Wood’s
opinion pointed out, the protection of migratory birds is comfortably within the interstate commerce power. In reversing the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court never actually said
that the CWA, taken at face value, could not be interpreted to
protect the habitat of migratory birds. It also never said that it
would be unconstitutional for Congress to enact a statute protecting their habitat. It just said that both were close questions, so
the constitutional avoidance canon justified ruling against the
agency’s decision.52 In that way, the Court was able to invalidate
the Migratory Bird Rule without actually confronting the arguments in Judge Wood’s opinion.53
Evidently the Court was looking for a way to strike down the
Rule. Judge Wood’s opinion anticipated a reason why: maybe the
Court was concerned that “the Corps will be trying to regulate the
filling of every puddle that forms after a rainstorm, at least if a
bird is seen splashing in it.”54 The Court’s later decision in Rapanos v United States,55 which further limited the scope of the
CWA, confirmed Judge Wood’s intuition. The plurality opinion in
that case detailed examples of what it called the “Corps’ sweeping
assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains.”56
The plurality also described the burdens that the permit

50 SWANCC, 191 F3d at 851, citing Rueth v United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 13 F3d 227, 231 (7th Cir 1993), United States v Huebner, 752 F2d 1235, 1239 (7th
Cir 1985), and United States v Byrd, 609 F2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir 1979).
51 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, S Rep No 92-1236,
92d Cong, 2d Sess 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 USCCAN 3776, 3822 (“The conferees fully
intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be
made for administrative purposes.”).
52 SWANCC, 531 US at 174.
53 The Court’s invocation of federalism was also a makeweight. The Court asserted
that “[p]ermitting [the Corps] to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling
within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ would result in a significant impingement of the States’
traditional and primary power over land and water use” and noted that the CWA had
stated, among its purposes, maintaining the role of states in land use decisions. Id at 174.
But any federal prohibition on water pollution—or, for that matter, any number of other
federal regulatory programs—could be characterized as affecting state governments’
power in a similar way.
54 SWANCC, 191 F3d at 850.
55 547 US 715 (2006).
56 Id at 726 (Scalia) (plurality).
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requirement placed on a developer who filled in a wetland in order
to build a shopping center.57 And it raised the specter of the Corps
“exercis[ing] the discretion of an enlightened despot” while regulating “an endless network of visible channels [that] furrows the
entire surface” of the land area of the United States.58 In
SWANCC, and then again in Rapanos, the Court apparently
thought it had to come up with an interpretation of the CWA that
would avert what it considered to be that nightmare scenario.
III. SWANCC, THE COURTS, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The Supreme Court’s decisions implicitly reflect—and Judge
Wood’s opinion abjures—a certain conception of the role of the
courts. The Supreme Court’s view seems to be that overweening,
“despotic” bureaucrats are the problem, and courts are the solution.
No one doubts that courts can impose some limits on the
power exercised by the Corps under Section 404(a). A specific decision to deny a permit can be challenged in court on the ground
that it was not reasonable; the municipalities in SWANCC initially raised, and then abandoned, such a challenge.59 Also, under
Chevron, an agency’s assertion of power has to rest on a reasonable interpretation of the governing statute.60 Beyond that, though,
the question is not whether the agency’s power should be limited;
it is whether the source of those limits should be the agency’s
judgment or the courts’. The Supreme Court’s decision in
SWANCC reflected a kind of inchoate intuition, on the part of a
majority of the Court, that the agency had gone too far, and that
the CWA somehow had to be interpreted to limit it. There is no
apparent reason for that intuition to prevail over the judgment of
the agency to which Congress has entrusted the enforcement of
the statute.
In fact, as SWANCC illustrates, there are often good reasons
not to trust the courts’ judgment. A party challenging an agency’s
action can focus attention on the particular hardship imposed on
it. That party wants to dispose of its garbage, or build on a wetland, and the permit requirement may substantially increase its
costs. By comparison, the harm that the permit requirement prevents—filling in a ditch or a swamp—can be trivialized. It is easy
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Chevron, 467 US at 844.

2020]

Migratory Birds and the Administrative State

2501

to portray the permit requirement as an example of senseless bureaucratic overreach, as the Court did in Rapanos in particular.61
But this is a cognitive bias, a point brought out by Judge
Wood’s emphasis on the aggregate effects of pollution. It is an artifact of resolving individual claims case by case, focusing on the
facts brought forward by the particular litigant seeking relief—
which is what courts characteristically do when they review agencies’ actions. This kind of distortion may be particularly severe in
the case of environmental regulation. The costs to the party challenging the regulation are often very salient; the competing costs
to the environment may accrete over time in remote places and
are much harder to visualize. The agency, which can take a
broader view of the potential harms and adopt general rules, is
less prone to those biases. This is a reason for courts to distrust
their own intuitions about whether the agency has gone too far and
to stick instead to established principles of deference to agencies.
There is an ideological element, too. The intuition that an
agency has gone too far, when it is not supported by wellgrounded statutory arguments—as it was not in the Supreme
Court’s decision in SWANCC—is bound to reflect the judges’ own
views about regulatory policy. The Supreme Court’s well-known
opinion in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council62 made just this point in a different context: in that case, the Court excoriated the DC Circuit for supplementing the procedural requirements of the APA in a way that,
the Court strongly suggested, reflected the DC Circuit’s opposition to nuclear power.63 A parallel problem can afflict the Supreme
Court itself: interpolating substantive requirements into the
CWA because of hostility to (what the justices perceive as) excessive environmental regulation. There is a lot of reason to think
that that is what happened in SWANCC.
Of course, agencies can have their own ideological dispositions. Even apart from ideology, they can be afflicted by tunnel
vision, or captured by interest groups, or subject to other pathologies. But there are established administrative law principles,
such as “arbitrary and capricious” review under the APA, to deal
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See Rapanos, 547 US at 719–21 (Scalia) (plurality).
435 US 519 (1978).
63 See id at 558 (“The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are not subject to reexamination in the federal courts
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with those problems. And, to make a familiar point, agencies are
politically accountable to a much greater degree than courts are.
CONCLUSION
Since SWANCC, the Supreme Court’s hostility to the administrative state has become a persistent feature of its decisions.64
Supreme Court opinions that read like Judge Wood’s opinion in
SWANCC—taking a broad view of both Congress’s power and the
reach of a regulatory statute and deferring to an agency’s view
under Chevron—are not very common these days. This may be a
particularly severe problem in the future, for reasons again suggested by SWANCC.
In the polarized political climate that prevails now, it is difficult for Congress to enact major regulatory statutes or to adopt
substantial revisions of existing regulatory regimes.65 As a result,
administrative agencies often have to operate under decades-old
statutes while addressing problems that were unforeseen when
those statutes were enacted.66 The use of the Clean Air Act67 to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions is a prominent example.68 This
situation is bound to strain the principles that govern judicial review of agency action. Courts will apply statutory criteria that
were drafted without any awareness of the kinds of problems that
the agencies are now addressing. If courts insist that agencies’
actions are invalid unless they were clearly contemplated by Congress (or nearly so), the result will be regulatory paralysis. But
excessive deference to agency freelancing is also not a good outcome. The courts’ responsibility will be to construct principles
that deal with this predicament in a realistic, nondogmatic way,
and certainly not to give in to ideologically driven preconceptions
about bureaucratic menace.
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66 See generally Jody Freeman and David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems,
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67 To Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention and Abatement of Air Pollution, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 USC
§ 7401 et seq.
68 See, for example, Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497,
533–35 (2007).
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A milder version of this problem—a gap between the particular matters that Congress focused on when it adopted a regulatory regime and the issues that the agency confronts—often exists
when courts review agency action; SWANCC is an example. There
is no reason to think that Congress specifically considered the
kinds of issues raised by the ponds, mudflats, and rivulets in
SWANCC. But those issues were broadly within the range of
problems that the CWA was enacted to address. The Congress
that enacted the CWA was, of course, aware that water pollution
endangered the habitat of migratory birds, and the explicitly
stated purpose of the CWA was to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”69 That is why Judge Wood’s reasoning—the CWA extended
Congress’s power to its constitutional limits; the protection of migratory birds’ habitat was well within those limits; and, if there
were any doubt, the agency’s determination should get deference
under Chevron—was correct. And that is why the Supreme
Court’s decision to reverse the Seventh Circuit in SWANCC, and
to continue on the same course in Rapanos, is one among many
troubling indications about the future of the administrative state.
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